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Background information 
 
What first attracted you to study economics? 
 
I was born in Israel in the midst of a geo-political conflict and vast regional 
inequalities and I was eager to get a better understanding of the world in which I live. 
My passion towards mathematics and philosophy and my interest in contemporary 
socio-political issues naturally led me into the branches of economics that integrate 
my passions and interests. 
 
Were there any specific individuals who influenced you? 
 
As Newton said, "If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants." 
My attempt to develop a unified theory of economic growth was influenced primarily 
by researchers from other scientific disciplines whose attempt to develop unified 
theories had a profound effect on the way that we understand the world.  
 




Your models tend to be very mathematical. Presumably you have always had a 
strong math background? 
 
Indeed. I have been fascinated by various fields of Mathematics, and along the 
course of my education I developed significant expertise in dynamical systems.
1 
Nevertheless, although my research tends to be rigorous mathematically, my 
extensive use of mathematical modelling is designed to subject the theory to proper 
logical scrutiny, without presenting a barrier to most readers. I tend to present my 
ideas and their foundations in a fashion that is excisable to the non-mathematical 
reader. 
 
                                                 
1 See Galor, 2007.   3
In your recent research you have been concentrating on issues related to very long-
run growth and development. What is it about this area that fascinates you? 
 
During the two decades that I have spent studying the process of development, I 
have become increasingly convinced that contemporary variations in economic 
development have deep roots in the distant past. I was determined to find coherent 
answers to the fundamental questions…Why are some countries poor while others 
are rich? What is the source of the dramatic increase in inequality across countries in 
the past two centuries? Are there lessons that can be learned from the growth 
experiences of the developed economies in order to alleviate the poverty in the less 
developed countries?  
 
The inconsistency of exogenous and endogenous growth models with some of the 
most fundamental features of the process of development, has led me to a search 
for a unified theory that would unveil the underlying micro-foundations of the growth 
process in its entirety, capturing the epoch of Malthusian stagnation that 
characterized most of human history, the contemporary era of modern economic 
growth, and the underlying driving forces that triggered the recent transition between 






In recent years there has been a revival of interest in economic history amongst 
many economists, including yourself and people like Daron Acemoglu.
3 Even Robert 
Lucas and Edward Prescott are writing about the Industrial Revolution.
4 Why do you 
think this has happened? 
 
Clearly, our understanding of the contemporary world is limited and incomplete in the 
absence of a historical perspective. However, the renewed interest in the interaction 
between economic development and economic history could be attributed to the 
                                                 
2 See Pomeranz, 2000. 
3 For example, Galor and Weil, 1999, 2000; Galor, 2005a; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006.  See 
Snowdon, 2007a,  for an interview with Daron Acemoglu. 
4 Lucas, 2002; Parente and Prescott, 2005.   4
increasing frustration with the failure of the a-historical branch of growth theory to 
capture some of the most fundamental aspects of the growth process. 
 
Is history in general something that has always attracted your interest? 
 
Absolutely. I have been intrigued by the evolution of humans and societies since pre-
history, and I devoted a significant portion of my time to read about our evolution 
from the emergence of early humans to the present. 
 
 
Unified growth models 
 
The exogenous and endogenous growth models of Robert Solow and Paul Romer 
were really developed to try and explain the growth process in the developed world.
5 
For example, Solow was particularly interested in explaining the growth experience 
of the US in his 1957 paper. The work of Malthus effectively describes the world 
before 1800.
6 Why do we need a model that can explain both the modern and 
Malthusian growth regimes, as well as providing an explanation of the evolution of an 
economy between these regimes? 
 
There are several fundamental reasons for the quest for a unified theory of economic 
growth. First, a comprehensive understanding of the hurdles faced by less 
developed economies in reaching a state of sustained economic growth would be 
futile unless the factors that prompted the transition of the currently developed 
economies into a state of sustained economic growth could be identified and their 
implications would be modified to account for the differences in the growth structure 
of less developed economies in an interdependent world. However, as you stated, 
neither exogenous and endogenous growth models nor Malthusian models generate 
insights about the forces that permitted economies to shift from Malthusian 
stagnation to a state of sustained economic growth. 
 
                                                 
5 Solow, 1956; Romer, 1986, 1990. See also Snowdon and Vane (2005) for a survey of the Solow and 
Romer models as well as interviews with both economists. 
6 Malthus, 1798.   5
Second, imposing the constraint that a single theory should account for the entire 
intricate process of development and its prime causes in the last thousands of years 
is a discipline that enhances the viability of growth theory.  The evolution of theories 
in older scientific disciplines suggests that theories that are founded on the basis of a 
subset of the existing observations and their driving forces may be attractive in the 
short run, but non-robust and eventually non-durable in the long run. The attempts to 
develop unified theories in physics have been based on the conviction that all 
physical phenomena should be governed by some underlying unity. Similarly, the 
entire process of development and its fundamental forces ought to be captured by a 
unified growth theory. 
 
Third, a unified theory of economic growth reveals the fundamental micro-
foundations that are consistent with the process of economic development over the 
entire course of human history, rather than with the past decades only. Similarly to 
the advancements that were made possible by the establishment of micro-
foundations to models of macroeconomics, it will improve not only the predictions of 
growth theory but its policy implications.  
 
What do you consider to be the strengths of the Solow and Romer growth models? 
 
These models have been instrumental in advancing our understanding of the role of 
factor accumulation and technological progress in the process of development in the 
modern era and in sustaining economic growth in the long-run. Nevertheless, it is 
important to acknowledge that they are inconsistent with the qualitative aspects of 
the growth process over most of human existence. In particular, in contrast to these 
models, during the Malthusian epoch capital accumulation and technological 
progress had a negligible effect on the long-run level of income and its growth rate, 
and they were counterbalanced almost entirely by an increase in the size of the 
population. 
   6
People such as Nobel Laureate Douglas North regard long-run growth and change 
as the key issue in economic history.
7 With your unified growth model are you trying 
to produce a general theory of economic history  
 
I suppose so. My unified growth theory provides a general theory of the evolution of 
economies over the entire course of human history. But, in fact, it is even more 
ambitious than that. It goes beyond economic history and examines the interaction of 
economic and human history. As you know, some of my recent research has 
examined the interaction between long-run economic development and human 
evolution.
8 It demonstrates that in contrast to the viewpoint advanced in the 
influential work by Jared Diamond, the evolution of the composition of human traits in 
the process of development is a significant force in the transition from stagnation to 
growth and in the understanding of comparative development. 
 
 
Growth regimes  
 
In your unified growth models you distinguish between three growth regimes, 
namely, the ‘Malthusian regime’, the ‘post-Malthusian regime’, and the ‘modern 
growth regime’. In general terms, before we look in more detail later, what are the 
main characteristics of each of these regimes?  
 
The Malthusian regime captures the early stages of economic development that 
lasted up until the middle of the 18
th century for modern developed economies, and 
until the beginning of the 20
th century for today’s developing countries. The 
Malthusian regime describes a world in a low level equilibrium in terms of income per 
capita. Technological progress takes place, but very slowly. The growth of total 
output resulting from technological progress is matched by population growth so that 
per capita income fluctuates around a low stable level, with no significant progress in 
                                                 
7 Douglass North was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1993 (jointly with Robert Fogel) for ‘ having 
renewed research in economic history by applying economic theory and quantitative methods in order 
to explain economic and institutional change’. See North, 1990, 1994, 2005; Fogel, 1994. North 
writes… ‘Understanding the process of economic change would enable us to account for the diverse 
performance of economies, past and present…. A real understanding of how economies grow unlocks 
the door to greater human well-being and to a reduction in misery and abject poverty’. 
8 Galor and Moav, 2001, 2002, 2005; Galor and Michalopoulos, 2006;  Ashraf and Galor, 2007b.   7
average living standards over a long period of time. The post-Malthusian regime 
marks the initial take-off from the Malthusian regime. This is an era when 
technological progress accelerates and consequently we observe the beginning of 
economic growth in per capita income terms even though population growth is still 
positively linked to rising incomes. The modern growth regime is triggered by a rise 
in the demand for human capital and a demographic transition. This is the era of 
rapid technological progress, sustained economic growth and rising per capita 
incomes. Unlike the previous two regimes, population growth is no longer 
counterbalancing the growth of income per capita.  
 
Are there any countries in the world today that are still trapped in a Malthusian 
growth regime? 
 
Many less developed economies are still faced by the main element of the 
Malthusian trap. Namely, their population growth has an adverse effect on their 
development process.  Nevertheless, it is difficult to determine in the short-run, 
whether technological progress in these economies or an increase in their available 
resources per capita (due to foreign aid, the discovery of natural resources, or 
increased mortality) would ultimately result in a faster rate of population growth that 
would offset significantly their output growth.  
 
Where would you locate China in terms of your regimes? Given China’s remarkable 
economic growth during the last twenty five years, can we say that China has 
entered the modern growth regime? 
 
China has indeed crossed the threshold of the modern growth regime. It is 
experiencing rapid technological progress, human capital formation, and sustained 
output growth without any significant offsetting effects of population growth.  
 
 
The Malthusian growth regime 
 
The Malthusian regime dominates just about all of human history until we come to 
the Industrial Revolution. Malthus’s famous book was published in 1798. Somewhat   8
ironically this was just about the time that the Malthusian regime was beginning to 
come to an end in Western Europe. So Malthus’s theory is a pretty good description 
of human history before 1800, but not after the publication of his book.
9 When you 
are researching into this area are you conscious  of this irony, that Malthus was 
writing down his growth model right at the time you identify as the beginning of the 
breakpoint between the Malthusian and post-Malthusian regimes? 
 
Indeed, this irony was one of the catalysts in my quest for a unified theory of 
economic growth. It made me realize that unless I will construct my theory on solid 
micro-foundations that capture diverse economic regimes, the theory is unlikely to 
survive a major shift in the economic paradigm, and the irony about the Malthusian 
theory may repeat itself. 
 
To what extent was an Industrial Revolution, and a consequent breakout of the 
Malthusian regime, inevitable?
10 Your Darwinian-evolutionary perspective also 
seems to imply that at some point a growth take-off was inevitable. Are the two 
approaches complementary? 
 
According to my unified growth theories the transition from stagnation to growth is an 
inevitable outcome of the process of development. 
 
During the Malthusian epoch technological progress permitted an increase in the 
size of the population, while population size affected the rate of technological 
progress. The size of the population determined the supply of, and demands for, 
ideas. It also influenced the diffusion of ideas, the degree of specialisation in the 
production process that stimulated ‘learning by doing’,
11 and the level of international 
trade that further fostered technological progress.  At the same time, the rate of 
technological progress and its effect on the resource constraint, enabled population 
growth.  
 
                                                 
9 For a recent discussion of Malthusian theory, see Galor and Weil 1999, 2000; Galor, 2005; and 
Clark, 2007. 
10 See also Kremer, 1993; Jones, 2001, 2005.  
11  See Arrow, 1962.   9
This inherent Malthusian positive feedback between the level of technology and the 
size of the population brought about a gradual acceleration in the pace of 
technological progress. Rapid technological progress, inevitably, raised the demand 
for human capital in the production process, in order to cope with the rapidly 
changing economic environment. The rise in the demand for human capital in the 
second phase of industrialization induced the formation of human capital, and led to 
a substitution, by parents, between the quality and quantity of children, triggering the 
onset of the demographic transition.
12 It brought about significant technological 
advancements along with a reduction in fertility rates and population growth, 
enabling economies to convert a larger share of the fruits of factor accumulation and 
technological progress into growth of income per capita, which paved the way for the 
emergence of sustained economic growth. 
 
Similarly, the evolutionary growth theory that I have advanced suggests that the 
transition from stagnation to growth is an inevitable outcome of the effect of the 
process of development in the Malthusian epoch on the selection of traits that are 
complementary to the growth process, such as higher valuation for child quality, 
entrepreneurial spirit, and longer life expectancy.
13 Hence the transition is brought 
about by a gradual change in the composition of the population, and its effect on 
technological progress and human capital formation. It is interesting to note that the 
non-evolutionary perspective suggests that the adverse effect of limited resources on 
population growth in the Malthusian era delays the process of development, while 
the evolutionary theory suggests that the Malthusian constraint generates the 
necessary evolutionary pressure for the ultimate take-off. 
 
Even if an Industrial Revolution was inevitable, we still need to explain why it 
happened in Britain rather than China, which had a much larger population.
14 In a 
recent interview that I conducted with Joel Mokyr, he argued that much more 
important than population size was the intellectual climate that pervaded Western 
                                                 
12 For an excellent discussion of the demographic transition, see Lee, 2003. 
13  See Galor and Moav 2002, 2005; Galor and Michalopoulos 2006. 
14 Maddison’s (2001) data indicates that the population of China in 1000 and 1700 AD was 59 million 
and 138 million respectively, whereas the UK’s population was  2 million and 8.5 million respectively. 
See also Maddison, 2007.   10
Europe and Britain during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
15 Douglass 
North emphasises the role of Institutions and the political impact of the Glorious 
Revolution in 1688.
16 Is there anything in your research which can lead us to an 
answer to the question…Why was Britain first? 
 
Unified growth theory is a Meta theory, a skeleton on which one can hang different 
elements that have generated variations in the performance across countries, such 
as England’s earlier industrialization in comparison to China. 
The theory suggests that the timing of the take-off is determined by the effect of the 
size of the population as well as it composition (namely education, entrepreneurial 
spirit, and even intellectual spirit), on technological progress and its effect on the 
demand for, and the formation of, human capital. But clearly, in order to account for 
comparative development, we have open these two theoretical black boxes and fill 
them with the cultural, institutional, demographic, and policy factors that determine 
the intensity of each of these effects in individual countries or regions.  
 
Indeed, in the absence of variations in these additional important dimensions, one 
may expect the first Industrial Revolution to take place in China. But once we allow 
for different institutions, policies, and cultural attitudes towards technological 
progress and education, then countries with large populations may nevertheless lag 
behind if they do not have the complementary forces that can stimulate technological 
progress, the demand for human capital, human capital formation, and fertility 
decline.  
 
For instance, once a technologically driven demand for human capital emerged in 
the second phase of industrialization, the prevalence of human capital promoting 
institutions, such as public education, determined the extensiveness of human 
capital formation, the timing of the demographic transition, and the pace of the 
transition from stagnation to growth. Hence variations in the presence of human 
capital promoting institutions across the globe may have contributed to the European 
dominance in the transition from agriculture to industry.
17 Similarly, geographical 
                                                 
15 See Snowdon, 2007b; Mokyr, 2005a, 2005b. See also Landes, 2006. 
16 See North and Weingast, 1989. 
17 See Galor, Moav and Vollrath, 2006.   11
variations may underline the earlier European take-off.  Societies that were 
geographically vulnerable to cultural diffusion were characterized by diminished 
cultural assimilation, higher cultural diversity and lower accumulation of society-
specific human capital. While reduced cultural assimilation diminished their 
performance in the technological paradigm that characterised the agricultural stage 
of development, their greater cultural diversity, fostered their ability to adapt to a new 




I was struck when reading your papers that you make frequent use of the ‘take-off’ 
concept. When I was a student, back in the late 1960s, discussion of Walt Rostow’s 
work was all the rage in economic history.
19 Rostow’s idea of various stages in the 
growth process, from primitive society, to pre-conditions for take-off, to the take-off, 
to the drive to maturity, and finally to the age of high mass consumption, at least 
stylistically, remind me of your growth regimes.  Were you influenced by Rostow’s 
work? 
 
Although I do not think that I was influenced directly by Rostow, it appears that I 
have constructed my unified growth theory around stages of development that has 
some parallels to the ones that he had in mind.  
 
 
The post-Malthusian growth regime 
 
How does an economy finally breakout of the low-level Malthusian equilibrium? 
 
As I pointed out earlier, the post-Malthusian regime marks the initial take-off from the 
Malthusian regime. The reinforcing interaction between population and technology 
during the Malthusian epoch changed the size and the composition of the population 
sufficiently so as to support a faster pace of technological progress and generated 
the transition to the Post-Malthusian Regime. The growth rates of output per capita 
increased significantly, and although the positive Malthusian effect of income per 
                                                 
18 See Ashraf and Galor, 2007a. 
19 See Rostow, 1956, 1960.   12
capita on population growth was still maintained, the sizable increase in population 
growth only offset some of the potential gains in income per capita. The acceleration 
in the rate of technological progress increased the industrial demand for human 
capital in the second phase of industrialization, and induced significant investment in 
human capital and the onset the demographic transition. 
 
To develop a single structure that can encompass all these features must have been 
a huge theoretical challenge. What were the main complications that you faced?  
 
Indeed, the establishment of a unified growth theory has been a great intellectual 
challenge. It required major methodological innovations in the construction of 
dynamical systems that could capture the complexity which characterized the 
evolution of economies from a Malthusian epoch to a state of sustained economic 
growth.   
 
Most economic historians view the Industrial Revolution as a gradual process that 
could not plausibly be viewed as the outcome of a major shock that shifted 
economies from the basin of attraction of the Malthusian equilibrium into the basin of 
attraction of the Modern Growth Regime. Hence, the simplest methodology for the 
generation of a phase transition, namely, a major shock in an environment 
characterized by multiple locally stable equilibria, appears inappropriate for 
generating the observed take-off from stagnation to growth. 
 
An alternative methodology for the observed phase transition was rather difficult to 
establish since a unified growth theory in which economies take off gradually from an 
epoch of a stable Malthusian stagnation would require a gradual escape from an 
absorbing (stable) equilibrium, which in itself sounds a bit of a contradiction 
(laughter). Ultimately, however, it has become apparent to me that this phase 
transition would be captured by a single dynamical system, if the set of steady-state 
equilibria and their stability would be altered qualitatively in the process of 
development due to latent state variables that evolve behind the scene and 
ultimately change the qualitative structure of the dynamical system allowing the 
economy to escape from the absorbing Malthusian equilibrium and gravitate towards 
a sustained growth regime. The long era of Malthusian stagnation of output per   13
capita masked the dynamism behind the scene that ultimately generates a take-off 
and escape from the Malthusian equilibrium. For example, during the 1-1750 period, 
world population quadrupled even though income per capita remained rather stable.  
 
When I constructed the model I did it in such a way that it contained a latent state 
variable that would ultimately bring about the change that we observe. I also needed 
to assure that during the take-off the positive relationship between population and 
income per capita would remain for some time, but then the model would generate, 
endogenously, a demand for human capital and a demographic transition. This is 
when I began to review the different theories of the demographic transition. 
 
 
The demographic transition 
 
With respect to explaining the demographic transition and falling birth rates, 
researchers have emphasised, for example,  falling infant mortality, the rising 
opportunity cost of women’s time,
20 the decline in the pensions motive for having 
children, and the reduction in family income generated from child labour due to 
public policies. What is your overall assessment of existing explanations of the 
demographic transition, and why have you focussed on an explanation that 
emphasises the demand for human capital?  
 
A natural starting point was Gary Becker’s theory.
21 Becker argues that the rise in 
the level of income induced a fertility decline because of two related reasons. First, 
the positive income effect on fertility that was brought about by the rise in income 
was dominated by the negative substitution effect that was triggered by the increase 
in the opportunity cost of raising children through forgone earning in labour force 
participation. Second, the income elasticity with respect to child quality is greater 
than that with respect to child quantity, and a rise in income therefore led to a decline 
in fertility along with a rise in the investment in each child. 
 
                                                 
20 Galor and Weil, 1996. 
21 See Becker, 1981.   14
When I reviewed the historical evidence, however, it became evident that the 
Beckerian theory appears inconsistent with the evidence. In the context of the 
relatively homogeneous region of Western Europe, the timing of the demographic 
transition was not negatively related to the level of income per capita, as the 
Beckerian theory would imply. The demographic transition occurred simultaneously 
in a set of countries whose income gap is in a ratio of 3:1 around 1870. For example, 
the demographic transition occurs in the 1870s in England where income per capita 
was around $3200 per year, in Germany where it was $1800 per year, and also in 
Finland where income per capita was only $1100 per year.
22 More generally, based 
on evidence on the relationship between income and fertility within and across 
economies it does not appear plausible that the rise in the level of income per capita 
is the driving force behind the demographic transition.  
 
I next examined the influence of declining infant mortality. The decline in infant and 
child mortality rates that preceded the decline in fertility rates in many countries in 
the world was among the factors that affected the level of fertility. Nevertheless, 
historical evidence does not indicate that the decline in mortality rates accounts for 
the reversal of the positive historical trend between income and fertility. The decline 
in fertility during the demographic transition in Western Europe occurred in a period 
in which the pace of mortality decline remained stable for nearly a century and it 
appears that it was triggered by a universal force that changed its course during this 
period.
23   
 
Ultimately, it became apparent that the dominating universal force that triggered the 
decline in fertility was the acceleration in the rates of technological progress in the 
post-Malthusian regime and its inevitable effect on the rise in the demand for human 
capital.
24 The increase in the rate of technological progress brought about an 
increase in the industrial demand for human capital in the second phase of 
industrialization which, along the lines of the Beckerian theory, induced a substitution 
by parents of quantity of children for quality of children and the onset the 
demographic transition. 
                                                 
22 See Maddison, 2003. 
23 See also, Doepke, 2004. 
24 See Galor 2005b.    15
 
 
Trade and the demographic transition 
 
You have an interesting paper, co-authored with Andrew Mountford, that links the 
patterns of specialisation and trade with the emergence of the ‘Great Divergence’ 
and the failure of the demographic transition to spread to countries like India until 
late in the twentieth century.
25 Specialisation helped to raise living standards in 
Britain, whereas it led to population growth in India. Can you explain the thinking 
behind this argument? 
 
The argument of that paper is that if trade opens up between advanced and less 
advanced economies, say Britain and India, at a time when Britain is more 
technologically advanced than India, then specialisation will imply that Britain 
produces industrial skill- intensive goods, whereas India will specialise in the 
production of primary goods which are much less skill intensive. The demand for 
human capital in Britain will increase leading to an earlier demographic transition. In 
India we should expect the demand for human capital to decline leading to a delay in 
the demographic transition. This would prolong the post-Malthusian regime in India 
and shorten it in Britain. It is important to note that while both Britain and India gain 
from trade, the composition of their gains is different. Much of the gain to India is in 
the form of population growth with a smaller part coming in the form of rising income 
per capita. In Britain most of the gains come in the form of rising income per capita.  
 
Where does this leave David Ricardo’s famous theory of comparative advantage 
which is popularly invoked by economists to demonstrate the mutual gains from 
specialisation and trade in terms of its impact on living standards?
26 Is the different 
outcome from your theory due to dynamic effects dominating static effects from 
specialisation and trade? 
 
Ricardo’s influential theory of comparative advantage suggests that if trade patterns 
follow the patterns of comparative advantage, trade is mutually beneficial and each 
                                                 
25 Galor and Mountford, 2004, 2006. 
26 Ricardo, 1817. See also, Irwin, 1996.    16
of the trading parties will generate a gain in aggregate income. However the 
Ricardian theory does not consider the possibility that population may be affected by 
the patterns of specialisation. Once you permit population to be endogenous we 
ought to reinterpret the famous argument about gains from trade. The gains from 
trade are in the context of total output. Even if the terms of trade effect equalises the 
gains from trade in terms of total output for the two trading economies, this does not 
imply that there will be similar gains in output per capita. Total output is the product 
of output per capita and population and there are two dimensions in which total 
output can be enlarged: population and output per capita. In the case of India the 
gains were relatively larger in the population dimension, whereas in the case of 
Britain it was mainly in the output per capita dimension. 
 
Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson argue that the expansion of 
Atlantic trade had beneficial effects on the British economy because it lead to a 
change in the political power structure in favour of an emerging entrepreneurial 
class.
27 This story complements their emphasis on the importance of institutions as 
the key determinant of economic success.
28 Does their trade story complement 
yours? 
 
My research has focused on the identification of the underlining economic forces that 
brought about the transition from stagnation to growth and the divergence in 
economic performance across countries. In particular, I have attributed the transition 
to a state of sustained economic growth to the rise in the demand for human capital 
and a decline in population growth. Their research, in contrast, abstracts from the 
transition from stagnation to growth and attributes contemporary differences in 
income per capita to the role of institutions. I view the indirect political economy 
mechanism complementary to my attempt to identify the direct economic forces that 
were generated by international trade and their consequences.  
 
Perhaps this would be a good point for me to comment more broadly about my view 
of the role of institutions in the process of development, particularly in the light of 
unified growth theory. As I explained earlier, the Malthusian epoch is governed by 
                                                 
27 Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005a. 
28 Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005b.    17
economic forces that will inevitably generate industrialisation and a transition to 
sustained economic growth. The rapidity of this process may be influenced by 
different factors including institutions.  But institutions, by themselves, do not trigger 
a take-off from stagnation to sustained economic growth. They simply affect the 
speed of this transition. Institutions can be viewed as the oil that lubricates the 
wheels of a train that is already in motion. The presence or absence of oil may affect 





In your ‘Das Human-Kapital’ paper, co-authored with Omer Moav, you argue that 
capitalists consciously brought about a transformation of society because of their 
positive attitude towards the promotion of mass education.
29 As technological 
progress accelerated, the complementarity of physical capital and human capital in 
the production process generated incentives for capitalists to support investment in 
human capital. Contrary to conventional Marxist thinking, capitalists, by actively 
supporting educational reforms, ultimately undermined the class structure. Claudia 
Goldin has also emphasised the importance of human capital in establishing US 
economic supremacy during the twenty first century.
30 As Goldin’s  paper shows, 
Europe lagged well behind the US in the promotion of mass education.
31 Since both 
European countries and the US were capitalist economic systems do you have any 
thoughts on why Europe lagged behind? 
 
Variations in the provision of public education over this period among equally 
developed economies could be partly attributed to non-economic objectives such as 
social and national cohesion, military efficiency, enlightenment, moral conformity, 
sociopolitical stability as well as religious reasons.  But perhaps the earlier onset of 
mass education in the US could be linked to the adverse effect of income inequality 
and the concentration of land ownership on human capital formation.
32 As the 
industrial demand for human capital emerged, differential human capital formation 
                                                 
29 Galor and Moav, 2006. 
30 Goldin, 2001. 
31 See also the interview with Claudia Goldin in Snowdon, 2008b. 
32 Galor and Zeira, 1993; Galor, Moav, and Vollrath, 2006.    18
occurred across countries. Even though individuals with credit constraints could not 
finance this growth promoting human capital formation, a conflict of interests 
between capitalists and the landed aristocracy affected the implementation of 
institutions that promote human capital formation, such as public education.  
 
So prior to industrialisation, the main conflict of interest in society was between the 
elite, largely the landed aristocracy, and labour. 
 
Indeed. Prior to industrialisation, the main conflict of interest in society was between 
the landed aristocracy and labour. The production process that occurred at this time 
implied that a larger output share to workers would result in a smaller share to the 
landed aristocracy. Industrialisation, however, shifted the conflict of interest in 
society from a conflict between the elite and the masses to a conflict between the 
landed aristocracy and the emerging capitalist elite. The capitalist elite tended to 
support education reforms so as to complement their capital in the production 
process. The landed aristocracy, on the other hand, objected to public education 
because human capital was more complementary to the industrial production 
process than the agricultural one. They feared that educated workers would depart 
from the agricultural sector and would bring about a decline in the rental rate. In 
places where land inequality was more pronounced and the landed aristocracy was 
therefore more powerful, one should expect to observe less human capital formation. 
In this respect the more egalitarian nature of the US society in that period may have 
led to the earlier promotion of mass education.  
 
Since you mention inequality, it is worth recalling that some economists have argued 
that inequality can promote economic growth. For example, fifty years ago, Nicholas 
Kaldor, developed a model of economic growth where inequality is good for growth 
because it concentrated income in the hands of the capitalist investing class.
33 What 
is your view on the relationship between inequality and growth? 
 
I think that the replacement of physical capital accumulation by human capital 
accumulation as the main engine of economic growth changed the effect of 
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inequality on the process of development.
34 In the early stages of industrialisation, 
when physical capital accumulation was the prime engine of economic growth, 
inequality enhanced the process of development. It diverted resources towards 
capitalists whose marginal propensity to save is higher and it increased the rate of 
investment and capital accumulation.  However, in the later stages of the transition to 
modern growth, once human capital emerged as the prime engine of economic 
growth, equality alleviated the adverse effect of credit constraints on human capital 
formation and stimulated the growth process. Finally, it appears plausible that at 
more advanced stages of economic development the impact of inequality on growth 
becomes more ambiguous. Credit constraints become less binding and their effect 
on efficient investment in human capital and investment projects is less pronounced, 
while the economic incentives that are generated by inequality remain in place.  
 
During the last twenty years or so, Robert Fogel has emphasised the importance for 
economic growth of what he calls the ‘technophysical evolution’ of the human 
population.
35 Until very recently in human history the vast majority of people were 
physically incapable of sustaining productive work for extended periods because of 
poor diet, health and general physical strength and stature. Does this neglected 
aspect of growth analysis play any part of your unified growth story? 
 
Certainly. When I refer to human capital in my unified theory of growth, I am 
interpreting human capital very broadly to include education and health. The rise in 
the demand for human capital and the emergence of human capital formation over 
the period of industrialisation can be viewed in the context of education as well as 
human health that allowed labour to be much more productive. 
 
 
The modern growth regime 
 
In the modern growth regime we have growth driven by technological progress and 
the demographic transition is more or less completed. Since technological progress 
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depends on new ideas, this is where your story must connect with Paul Romer’s 
work on endogenous technological change. 
36  
 
Romer’s research as well as the work of Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt, and Gene 
Grossman and Elhanan Helpman is instrumental for the understanding of the role of 
ideas in promoting technological progress and sustaining economic growth.
37 Unified 
growth theory employs a similar underlying structure that generates technological 
progress and sustained economic growth.  
 
In William Baumol’s recent work he has stressed the importance of innovation and of 
the crucial role of entrepreneurship in fostering and sustaining economic growth.
38 
Where does the entrepreneur fit in with your explanation of long-run growth? 
 
In unified growth theory technological progress in the modern growth regime is 
governed by human capital formation. This flexible theoretical black box can be 
adjusted to the growth experience of individual countries, by incorporating the 
elements that are unique to these economies. In particular, the effect of human 
capital on technological progress will be stronger in a society in which intellectual 




One worrying feature of the modern growth regime that has emerged in recent years 
is the problem of demographic ageing. In a sense we now have the reverse of 
Malthus in that in many countries a major concern is that the fertility rate has fallen 
below the replacement rate. In many developed countries population is forecast to 
fall, in some cases like Japan, quite dramatically.
40 This problem is also affecting 
countries of the former Soviet Union and China. Can this phenomenon fit into your 
long-run story of growth? 
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Unified growth theory can generate a long-run equilibrium with declining, stable, or 
rising population growth. You should note, however, that a declining population 
growth will induce a substitution of quality for quantity of children and the decline in 
fertility therefore will be associated with an increase in investment in human capital 
for each individual. As a result, the productive capacity of individuals will rise from 
generation to generation and may permit the support of the proportionately larger 
ageing population.  
 
Another issue that is currently a central focus of discussion relates to the relationship 
between growth and the environment and the problem of global warming. In Britain 
last year we saw the publication of the Stern Report which caused a huge, and 
ongoing, public debate on this issue.
41 If every country in the world eventually joins 
the modern growth regime, can the world as a whole sustain growth on such a global 
scale into the distant future, or will we have to completely rethink the way we live? 
Are you confident that technology can solve the problems caused by global warming, 
assuming that it is caused by human activity? 
 
Indeed, if population growth in the world will keep on growing, as it did during the 
twentieth century, then we will face a major demographic catastrophe. However, I 
am not concerned about this possibility. I think before we will reach a catastrophe, 
resource constraints will raise the cost of raising children sufficiently so as to assure 
that population growth will come to a halt. Similarly, if technological progress will not 
permit us to control global warming, its adverse effects will generate an economic 
slowdown to a rate of economic growth that can be sustained by the environment.  
 
Economic growth comes in for a lot of criticism for the costs it imposes on society, 
particularly from environmentalists. Ben Friedman’s recent book, The Moral 
Consequences of Economic Growth, provides a spirited defence of economic growth 
in terms of the many beneficial, and often neglected, effects that growth has on 
society.
42 Friedman argues that when economic growth increases material living 
standards, for a majority of the population, it also tends to promote social and 
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political progress. Do you share Friedman’s vision on this aspect of economic 
growth? 
 
I entirely share this viewpoint. I think that economic growth alleviates poverty, 
increases social mobility, generates the income that allows people to fulfil their 
potential, and promotes freedom. 
 
 
Culture, religion and economic growth 
 
There has been a recent revival of interest in the influence of culture and religion and 
on the economic performance of nations.
43 I note that in a recent paper you have 
also entered this debate.
44 What are the basic ideas in that paper and how does it 
relate to unified growth theory? 
 
This research argues that variations in the interplay between cultural assimilation 
and cultural diffusion have played a significant role in giving rise to differential 
patterns of economic development across the globe.  At the start of the 2nd 
millennium CE, civilisations of Asia were arguably well ahead of European societies 
in both wealth and knowledge. By the 12th century, China employed water-driven 
machinery to make textiles and coke-based smelting to produce iron. These 
technologies, however, would not appear in Europe for more than five hundred 
years. Yet, during the process of the Industrial Revolution, the technological leaders 
of the pre-industrial era were leapfrogged by European economies that accelerated 
into the modern age of sustained economic growth. What can explain the delayed 
emergence of sustained growth in China and other leading agricultural societies?  
 
In contrast to the cultural and institutional hypotheses, which posit a hierarchy of 
cultural and institutional attributes in terms of their conduciveness to innovation and 
their ability in fostering industrialisation, the theory suggests that the desirable 
degree of the relative prevalence of cultural assimilation versus cultural diffusion 
varies according to the stage of development. Enhanced cultural assimilation is 
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optimal within a given stage of development, but is detrimental for the transition 
between technological regimes. Hence, while cultural traits themselves do not 
necessarily have a differential effect on the process of development, it is the 
variation in the relative strengths of the forces of cultural assimilation and cultural 
diffusion, determining the diversity of these traits, which is instrumental for 
comparative economic development. 
 
It is argued that productivity is enhanced by diversity-driven accumulation of general 
human capital but reduced by inefficiencies in the intergenerational transmission of 
society-specific human capital that is associated with diminished assimilation. Thus, 
societies that were geographically less vulnerable to cultural diffusion benefited from 
enhanced assimilation, lower cultural diversity and greater accumulation of society-
specific human capital, flourishing in the technological paradigm that characterised 
the agricultural stage of development. This greater cultural rigidity, however, 
diminished the ability of these societies to adapt to a new technological paradigm, 
delaying their industrialisation and take-off to a state of sustained economic growth. 
 
 
Geography v institutions 
 
Another important debate in the growth literature has been that between those who 
stress the importance of institutions in the growth process, such as Douglass North, 
Daron Acemoglu, Bill Easterly, and Dani Rodrik,  and those who believe that 
economists have on the whole neglected the importance of geographical factors, 
such as David Landes, Jared Diamond, and  Jeffrey Sachs.
45 You have already 
mentioned the influence of geography with respect to its impact on cultural diffusion, 
but what are your general thoughts on the importance of geography with respect to 
its influence on the prosperity of nations? Have economists perhaps neglected the 
importance of geography? 
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I would enlarge the context of this debate and frame it in the context of the 
comparative role of geography, human capital, and institutions in the process of 
development. Clearly, variations in geographical factors preceded those in human 
capital and institutions. Geographical factors affected the genetic make up of the 
population, human capital formation, and presumably the evolution of institutions 
over time. 
 
The influential thesis of Jarred Diamond suggests that contemporary variations in 
economic development could be traced to bio-geographical factors that led to 
regional variations in the timing of the Neolithic Revolution. He argues that the 
Neolithic Revolution conferred a developmental head-start to societies that 
experienced an earlier transition from primitive hunting and gathering techniques to 
the more technologically advanced agricultural mode of production. According to this 
hypothesis, the favorable bio-geographic endowments that contributed to the 
emergence of agriculture gave some societies the early advantage of operating a 
superior production technology and generating resource surpluses, which enabled 
the establishment of a non-food-producing class whose members were crucial for 
the development of written language and science, and for the formation of cities, 
technology-based military powers and nation states. The early dominance of these 
societies subsequently persisted throughout history, being further sustained by 
geopolitical and historical processes such as colonization.  
 
While geographical conditions may have a direct effect on the performance of 
societies today via the disease environment and the feasibility of extensive trade, it 
appears to me plausible that geographical factors had primarily an indirect effect 
through human capital formation and institutions. As I emphasized earlier, my 
viewpoint is that the role of human capital dominates the role of institutions in the 
process of development. While the formation of human capital was a critical force in 
triggering the transition from stagnation to growth, institutions affected only the pace 
of this transition. 
 
 
Prospects for global convergence 
   25
During the last two hundred years we have witnessed global divergence.
46 There are 
many views about the current path of world inequality held by economist such as 
Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Branco Milanovic, and Francois Bourguignon.
47 Do you think 
the world will witness global convergence in the twenty-first century?
48 
 
I think that the twenty-first century will witness convergence between middle income 
countries and rich economies, but the gap between these economies and the very 
poor ones is unlikely to be narrowed.  Unfortunately, there is no hierarchy of 
institutions. Their effectiveness is state dependent.  We cannot just drop on poor 
economies institutions that are suitable for the most developed ones and expect 
dramatic changes to occur. If we share the hypothesis advanced by unified growth 
theory that human capital formation is a key factor in the transition from stagnation to 
growth, it would still be difficult to orchestrate a sustained simultaneous move 
whereby both the demand and supply of human capital will be present leading to a 
virtuous circle of development and technological progress. The process of 
development is a gradual one and convergence is particularly difficult for less 
developed economies in an interdependent world.  
 
Earlier this year I interviewed Francois Bourguignon, Chief Economist at the World 
Bank. In response to one of my questions he said… ‘When I first arrived at the World 
Bank from academia I believed that the problem of development was primarily an 
economic one requiring economic policy solutions.  More and more, with experience, 
I am becoming convinced that the problem of development is political, and many of 
the political problems in developing countries are rooted in the issue of inequality ’.
49 
It follows that even if economists know what policies are conducive to growth, there 
are powerful political barriers to the adoption of these growth-enhancing policies.
50 
Would you agree with this assessment? 
 
Political factors are undoubtedly very important and should be considered in the 
design of economic policy for less developed economies. However, unless we 
                                                 
46 See Pritchett, 1997; Maddison, 2001. 
47 Bourguignon and Morrisson, 2002; Milanovic, 2006; Sala-i-Martin, 2006. See also     
   Balcerowicz and Fischer (2006) and the  interview with Xavier  Sala-i-Martin in Snowdon,  2007a. 
48 Galor, 1996. 
49 Snowdon, 2008c. 
50 See Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006.   26
understand the economic forces that would enable less developed economies to 
follow the path of the developed world towards sustained economic growth, one 
cannot design the proper policy that will circumvent these political barriers. 
 
 
The ‘Industrial Revolution’ v ‘Neolithic Revolution’ 
 
Do you think that the Industrial Revolution represents the most important event in 
human history? 
 
I would argue that the ‘Neolithic Revolution’ was at least as important for 
contemporary economic outcomes.  As I discussed earlier, Jared Diamond 
convincingly argues that variations in the timing of the Neolithic Revolution has a 
significant effect on comparative development. Moreover, my recent research about 
human evolution and economic development and the biological origins of the 
Industrial Revolution suggests that the Neolithic Revolution is a point in human 
history that has had a long-lasting effect on the composition of the human population 
and therefore on contemporary stages of development. The Agricultural Revolution 
and the establishment of individual, rather than tribal, property rights expedited the 
process of natural selection and increased the representation in the population of 
individuals, whose characteristics were complementary to the growth process. This 
evolutionary process accelerated the transition from stagnation to sustained 
economic growth.   
 
Interestingly, I am in the midst of empirical research about the effect of the Neolithic 
Revolution on life expectancy today.
51 In the past few years I have been advancing a 
theory about the evolution of life expectancy. I argue that the rise in population 
density, the domestication of animals, and the increase in work effort in the course of 
the Neolithic Revolution increased the exposure and the vulnerability of humans to 
environmental hazards, such as infectious diseases. This rise in the mortality risk 
generated an evolutionary advantage to individuals who were genetically pre-
disposed towards higher somatic investment. It increased their representation in the 
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population, and led to the observed increase in life expectancy in the post-Neolithic 
period. 
 
 More recently I started to examine this theory empirically. I find that a significant 
portion of contemporary variations in life expectancy across countries can be traced 
to the time elapsed since the ancestors of the population of each country today 
experienced the Neolithic Revolution.  In particular, regressing current life 
expectancy on the timing of the Neolithic Revolution, ten thousand years ago in 
some places, one thousand years ago in other places, while accounting for income, 
education, health expenditure per person, and geographical characteristics, every 
one thousand years of earlier transition to the Neolithic period contributes about 1.5 
years to life expectancy today. These results implies that, for instance, the European 
population that experienced the Neolithic Revolution on average 3160 years earlier 
than the African population would be expected to live 5 years longer, even if the gap 
in the socioeconomic conditions between these continents will be eliminated. 
Similarly, Americans from European decent would be expected to live five years 
longer than Americans from African decent with similar socioeconomic background. 
 
These findings as well as those that support the Diamond hypothesis implies that the 
Neolithic Revolution was indeed a very important event in human history and 
probably affected the composition of human populations and human capital 
formation in a very dramatic way. Ultimately this fed back into the process of 





In addition to the research you have just outlined, what else are you currently 
working on? 
I am engaged in a major research project, a very exciting one, with my exceptional 
doctoral student, Quamrul Ashraf.
52 This research attempts to identify long-run 
historical forces that have influenced current development. It examines the role of 
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human genetic diversity within a society as an important determinant of its economic 
development. Contrary to the uni-causal hypothesis of Diamond, this research 
establishes that, while the timing of the transition to agriculture is indeed an 
important determinant of economic development, the composition of human 
populations with respect to their overall genetic diversity has been an equally 
significant factor in this regard.  
 
In the first stage of this research, the study examines the hypothesized effect of 
human genetic diversity within societies on their population densities in the years 1 
CE, 1000 CE and 1500 CE. 
 
Why is population density so important? 
 
The examination of comparative economic development in the pre-colonial era, 
when societies were in their agricultural stage of development, requires the 
interpretation of outcomes from a Malthusian steady-state point of view. This implies 
that the relevant outcome variable for comparative development is population density 
as opposed to income per capita since, given the natural productivity of land with 
respect to agriculture, any surplus generated by total factor productivity is channeled 
into population growth while income per capita remains stable in the long-run.  
 
The empirical analysis shows that human genetic variables and the timing of the 
Neolithic Revolution each explain slightly over twenty per cent of the variation in 
population density. The empirical analysis therefore confirms the importance of the 
Neolithic Revolution for comparative development, but Diamond’s conjecture that 
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